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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DIANE L. SPANGLER,

]

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vsMARTIN ALLEN SPANGLER,

]
i
]

Case No.

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action of divorce brought by Diane L.
Spangler, Plaintiff and Respondent, against Martin A. Spangler,
Defendant and Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon the hearing held in the lower court, the lower
court granted a judgment of decree of divorce to the Respondent
making a division of the property of the parties and awarding
a judgment of child support as against the Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this court affirm the decision
of the trial court and to award the Respondent attorney's fees
for this appeal.
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
The Defendant/Appellant, will hereinafter be referred to as the "husband," and the Plaintiff/Respondent
will be referred to as the "wife."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this law suit were married in Ogden,
Utah on June 1, 1968.

They have one child, Shane Alexander

Spangler, which was born in 1971 and is presently five years
old.

(Record - Page 3, Line 12-16)

The wife sought a

divorce in this case because the husband refused to assume
any responsibility for supporting her and his son.
husband left his wife twice.

The

The first time was from

December 1972 until the summer of 1973.

During this period

the husband did not contribute any support to his wife or
son.

(R - P . 20, L. 18-31)

vidual.

(R - P. 3, L. 31 —

He also lived with another indiP. 4, L. 12)

During the last

period of separation from June of 197 5 until the time of the
divorce, the husband contributed a total of $225 towards the
support of his wife and minor child.
P. 72, L. 5 —

(R - P. 22, L. 9-15;

P. 74, L. 18)

The wife, prior to her marriage to the husband,
owned two pieces of property.

One piece of property, here-

inafter referred to as the "Adams property," was purchased
in April of 1967 for $10,600.

The other property, hereinafter

referred to as the "Liberty property," was assigned to the
2
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clrssa

f:he

husband

did make some improvements on the Liberty property.

However,

said improvements were not as extensive as claimed by the
husband.

The husband helped panel the kitchen, repair the

roof, and put in some carpeting.

( R - P . 29, L. 9 —

P. 29,

L. 15)
In May and June of 1972 both the Adams and Liberty
properties were sold with total net proceeds from both
sales in the sum of $12,298.68. This money was invested in
the purchase of property in Willard, Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "Willard property."

(Plaintiff's Exhibit #1)

Said property consisted of one acre of land, a home, a brick
barn, a small cottage and a garage.

(Pv - P. 15, L. 8-10)

$7,000 of said money came directly from the sale of the Adams
property which was owned by the wife prior to the time she
married the husband and which contributed a substantial amount
of income to said marriage in the form of rental income*
(Plaintiff's Exhibit #1)

The Willard property was purchased

for $28,000 on a contract which required the total purchase
price to be paid within two years.

( R - P . 15, L. 11-18)

In December of 197 2, six months after the Willard property
had been purchased, the husband left the wife and did not
return until the summer of 1973.

The wife testified that

during this period of time the husband did not contribute
any money to his wife or child for their support.

(R-P. 20,

L. 18-31) Although the husband claims he sent money home, he
acknowledges that he does not know the amount, the dates,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and does not have any records demonstrating said contributions.

(R - P. 63, L. 31 —

P. 71, L. 17-26)

>

In December of 1972, the wife deeded a lot on the
Willard property to her father with the understanding that
her father would build a home on the lot for the wife.

The

wife subsequently disposed of all of the Willard property
with the exception of a cottage and the building lot and
used the money from that sale to pay off the contract indebtedness leaving the cottage and lot unencumbered.
L. 19 —

P. 16, L. 31)

the lot as agreed.

(R - P. 15,

The wife's father built a home on

The wife mortgaged the property for the

materials used in building the home in the sum of $7,774 and
agreed to pay the wife's father $14,400.

This $14,400 in-

cludes labor computed at one and one-half times the cost of
materials amounting to approximately $11,661 and the installation of a septic tank, water lines and connections, and
additional materials not included in the mortgage.
L. 3-16; R - P. 18, L. 32 —
L. 28 - P. 44, L. 4)

P. 19 L. 1; and

(R - P. 17,

R - P. 43,

The husband testified that he did not

know how much money was owed' to the father for labor on the
home.

(R - P. 67, L. 4-7)

The husband also acknowledges

that the wife had put in over $7,000 into the Willard home
from property that was hers prior to the marriage.

(R - P. 75,

L. 20-23)
The husband returned to the wife in the summer of 1973
and remained until June 197 5.

During that period of time

he did not contribute any money towards the payment of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mortgage on the home, however, he did make some improvements
on the Willard home.

The husband placed a roof on the home,

built a chain link fence around it, put in some storm windows,
and poured a driveway.

The husband also used a joint income

tax return to purchase carpet for the home*
P. 32, L. 18)

(R -. P. 30, L. 28

During this period of time, the husband lived

in the home without any contribution except the improvements
mentioned above.
The home and the cottage which constituted the
Willard property was appraised at $33,000.
Exhibit #5)

(Defendant's

The court found that of the $12,000 received

for the two pieces of property owned by the wife prior to
the marriage, $7,000 could be traced, and that that value
should remain in the plaintiff.

The court also found that

the wife's father had a claim against the home in the sum
of $14,400 and that a mortgage had been incurred on the home
to pay for materials in.the sum of $7,774 leaving an
approximate equity in the sum of $3,000 which was to be
divided equally between the parties.
P. 83, L. 9 —

(R - P. 80, L. 5-23—

P. 84, L. 23)

The wife waived her rights to alimony and testified
that she needed $200 per month child support and that $121
of said sum was needed for the purposes of keeping the child
in a day care center while the wife worked.

(R - 24, L. 3-15)

The husband testifed that he v/as willing to pay $121 per month

6
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child support to offset the cost of the day care for his
child.

(R - P. 70, L. 17-28)

The husband testified he

was unemployed and claimed that he suffered injuries on
the job in 1974 which prevents him from working in the
steel business.

However, while the husband did receive

Workman's Compensation he was never awarded any permanent
disability or given a disability rating by reason of the
alleged injury.

(R - P. 76, L. 32 —

P. 77, L. 2)

The

husband acknowledges that he has a high school education,
has worked as a steel worker, a barber, and as a carpenter.
(R - P. 56, L. 4-23)

The husband also says he is an in-

ventor and has made approximately $15,000 on his inventions.
(R- P. 51, L. 32)

The husband acknowledges that the only

efforts he has made to find employment is to contact various
places in Salt Lake City for a job as a barber.

(R - P. 76,

L. 2-8)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The husband, in his brief, cites Utah cases to
support his allegation that the trial court's distribution
of assets was an abuse of discretion.

He attempts, by the

use of those cases, to establish that a distribution of
marital assets with one-third to the spouse and two-thirds
to the husband is an accepted practice in the State of Utah

7
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and is fair and equitable.
support this proposition.

The husband cites two cases to
One is Wooley vs. Wooley, 113,

Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948) and the other is Anderson vs.
Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967).

While both

of those cases affirm a trial court decision granting onethird to the wife and two-thirds to the husband, they do not
stand for the proposition that this is a standard that applies
in all cases.

The position of the court is clearly set out

in the following statement taken from the Anderson case:
The court frequently emphasizes that "no
firm rule can be uniformly applied in all
divorce cases, . . . each must be determined
upon the basis of the immediate fact situation.
. . . Recent pronouncements of this court, and
the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect
that the trial judge has considerable latitude
of discretion in such matters and that his
judgment should not be changed lightly, and
in fact, not at all, unless it works such a
manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate
a clear abuse of discretion."
The extent of this discretion is emphasized
by the great disparity of results allowed in
differing factual situations. . • .
A similiar statement of lav/ was made by the court
in the case of Searle vs. Searle, Utah, 522 P.2d 697 (1974).
The court in that case stated:
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this court in a case of equity to
review the facts as well as the law, Article
VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, the
trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests in a divorce case. The actions of
the trial court are indulged with a presumption
of validity, and the burden is upon appellant
to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. There is no fixed
8
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rule or formula for the division of property;
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides that
when a decree of divorce is made the court
may make such orders in relation to property
as may be equitable. The trial court has a
responsibility to endeavor to provide a just
and equitable adjustment of their economic
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis*
This court held in the Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2d
378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967) that the court would review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the
trial court and would not disturb said findings just because
it might view the matter differently.
It is the position of the wife that the evidence
should be viewed in the light most favorable to her and that
the husband has failed to prove that such a serious inequity
existed in the decision of the trial court as to overcome
the presumption of validity and to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.
The husband in his argument acknowledges that one
of the items to be considered by a court in making a property
distribution is the fault of the parties involved.

The

husband implies in his argument that he is without fault in
this divorce.

Such an implication is totally unsupported by

the evidence.

The evidence presented in the trial court did

not demonstrate any grounds for divorce on the part of the
husband.

A divorce was granted to the wife because the

husband refused to assume any responsibility for the support
of his wife and his son and because the husband had left the

9
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wife on two occasions and during one of these periods had
been living with another individual.

If the husband is

maintaining that fault should be taken into consideration by
the court, then he would have to concede that the wife should
be entitled to a greater portion of the assets because of
the fault on the part of the husband•
The husband claims that a 50 percent division of
the real property should be made because of the contributions
made by the husband during the time he was married.

It is

the position of the wife that the court in fact did make a
50 percent distribution of the real property.

However, the

wife does not concede that the husband made any substantial
contributions towards the real property which v/as accumulated
during the marriage.

The wife owned the Adam's property

prior to the time she married the husband.

The Liberty pro-

perty was transferred to the wife prior to her marriage to the
husband to compensate the wife for secretarial services she
had rendered for the husband and for four months rent which
the husband had not paid.

These two pieces of property were

sold and the $12,298 received therefrom was invested in the
Willard property.

After the husband had deserted her the

wife, with the help of her father, sold part of the Willard
property and built a home in which to live.
The husband now claims that he is entitled to part
of the Willard. property even though the property was purchased entirely with the wife's assets and built through the
efforts of the wife and her father without any assistance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from the husband.

The husband did make some improvements

on the home but also lived in the home from 1973 until 1975,
when he again deserted his wife without contributing any
substantial amount to her support.

It is difficult to

understand how the husband can claim that the wife should
support herself, her minor child, acquire property, build a
home and then be obligated to divide the equity in that
home with the husband who had neglected his family responsibilities.
The husband's major contention is that the trial
court made an error in determining the amount of outstanding
obligations against the property owned by the parties at the
time of the divorce.

The trial court determined that the

Willard property had an outstanding indebtedness against it
in the sum of $7,774 v/hich represented a mortgage and $14,4 00
which constituted an obligation owed to the wife's father
for the construction of the home.

The,court determined

that an additional $7,000 could be traced from the approximately $12,000 of property owned by the wife prior to the
time she married the husband.

Consequently, the court held

that there was approximately $3,000 worth of equity remaining
in the home and ordered that the husband receive a lien for
$1,500 of said sum.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the husband
acknowledged that the wife had put in over $7,000 into the
Willard property which could be traced from assets belonging
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

to the wife prior to their marriage.

The husband, in his

brief, does not allege that the court was incorrect in
allowing the v/ife to trace assets that she possessed prior
to her marriage.

This court has held that a trial court

has broad discretion in dealing with property belonging to
the parties and has recognized the tracing of separate
property in determining a property distribution.
The husband contends that the obligation owed to
the wife's father is $11,661 rather than $14,400 as found
by the court.

The husband's attorney, Mr. Vlahos, asked

the wife on cross examination the basis of the agreement
to compensate the father for his labor.

The wife testified

that the basic agreement was one and one-half times the
cost of materials but denied that the sum owed was $11,6 61.
In response to Mr. Vlahos' cross examination the wife
stated as follows:
MR. VLAHOS:

I'm asking her if, based on

her agreement with her father, $11,6 61 would
not be the correct figure you would owe your
father.
A:

No.

Q:

Did you have some sort of other agree-

ment to raise it up to $14,400?
A:

Well, yeah.

He put in a septice tank

and a number of materials that he didn't charge
me for, that isn't on this mortgage, and that's
what we were basing our figures on.

(R - P. 43,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The husband testified that he had no knowledge of how much
was owed to the father for the labor on the home.

Therefore,

the only evidence presented before the court was to the
effect that the obligation for labor on the home amounted to
$14,400.

The court accepted this figure and based its deci-

sion on it.

The husband by attacking the court's decision

on the distribution of real property is asking this court to
accept the $11,661 figure as being accurate when it is not
supported by the evidence and the trial court found that was
not the correct sum.
The husband apparently claims that the court's
award of child support in the sum of $75 per month while the
husband is unemployed and $135 per month when the husband
earns $4 0 0 or more is unequitable and an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.

The husband alleges that the wife is

a competent individual and that the husband is not and,
consequently, he should not be required to pay the child support
as prescribed by the court.

The evidence presented before

the court indicates that the husband has a high school
education, has worked as a steel worker, a barber and as a
carpenter.

He is also an inventor.

The husband stated in

his testimony that he was willing to pay $121 per month as
child support.

The husband has no obligation to pay any

bills incurred during the marriage and does not have to
pay alimony.

There is no evidence which demonstrates that

the husband is unable to meet the child support as ordered
by the court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE WIFE SHOULD BE GRANTED COST AND A REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR THIS APPEAL.
The wife contends that the appeal of the husband
is unfounded and without merit.

Consequently, the wife prays

that the court grant her reasonable attorney's fees plus cost
of court incurred in this appeal.

Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. pro-

vides that the court can award attorney's fees and this court
has held that a reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded on
appeal.

See Anderson vs. Anderson, 13 Utah P.2d 36, 368

P.2d 264; Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah, 564, 65 P.2d 642;
and Peterson vs. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961.
CONCLUSION
The wife contends that the evidence presented before
the trial court supports it's determination that the equity
in the Willard property was $3,000 and the trial court's
division of the marital property.

The wife also contends

that the husband is financially capable of paying child
support and attorney's fees as awarded by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the wife respectfully requests that this
court affirm the decision of the trial court and award the
wife attorney's fees and costs of court for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
427 - 27th Street
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